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Controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders in listed ﬁrms has caused widespread con-
cern in academic circles. Numerous studies show that controlling shareholders often proﬁt from minority
shareholders through related-party transactions, particularly in emerging economies with poor protection
of minority shareholders. For example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000), Johnson et al. (2000), Glaeser
et al. (2001) and Chang (2003) all ﬁnd that major shareholders are able to proﬁt from minority shareholders
through tunneling. Cheung et al. (2006) investigates related-party transactions between companies listed in
Hong Kong and their controlling shareholders. They discover that ﬁrms that announce these transactions earn
signiﬁcantly lower excess returns than those that do not. They also ﬁnd that ﬁrms listed in Hong Kong with
ultimate shareholders in mainland China are more likely to expropriate from minority shareholders through
related-party transactions. Controlling shareholders can engage in such expropriation by occupying or shifting
funds, by obtaining related-party loans and by selling assets or products below market price to companies with
which they enjoy a close relationship. Jiang et al. (2010) ﬁnds that controlling shareholders of listed ﬁrms tun-
nel from these ﬁrms by means of inter-corporate loans. Zhou et al. (2003) reveal that asset transactions
between listed ﬁrms and their controlling shareholders are accompanied by transfers of wealth, with the asset
revaluation rate of these transactions often higher than that between the ﬁrms and their minority shareholders.
Li et al. (2005) report that tunneling operations also exist in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in China. Chen
et al. (2003) investigate controlling shareholders’ actions against minority shareholders and ﬁnd that a high-
dividend policy serves as a tool allowing these shareholders to shift resources from listed ﬁrms rather than
increase ﬁrm value.
In reality, however, controlling shareholders do not always carry out related-party transactions to expro-
priate wealth from minority shareholders. Propping is also common in listed ﬁrms in China. Controlling
shareholders sometimes “prop up” the ﬁrms they control for some speciﬁc purpose. For instance, Air China,
China Southern Airlines and China Eastern Airlines collectively lost RMB27.8 billion in 2008 after engaging
in unsuccessful hedging exercises. To ease the ﬁnancial distress of these ﬁrms, their controlling shareholder, the
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Co. (SASAC), provided them with an instant capital
injection.1 In the same year, Central Huijin Investment Ltd. injected funds into three major state-owned banks
to satisfy their need for capital to better support listed companies. In 2009, after ST Zhangjiajie (000430) had a
ﬁnancial deﬁcit for two consecutive years and investors had been warned of its delisting risk, the ﬁrm’s con-
trolling shareholder issued a written announcement promising to provide funding in the following year. By
means of M&As, related-party transactions and equity selling, the controlling shareholder of ST Zhujiang
(000505) successfully helped the ﬁrm to escape delisting, putting on a show of uncapping, capping and uncap-
ping again.2
Controlling shareholders most commonly prop up their listed ﬁrms when the ﬁrms are facing ﬁnancial dis-
tress or are in need of funding.3 The means by which they engage in such propping actions are capital injec-
tions, loan guarantees, related-party transactions and other types of proﬁt transfers that are in the opposite
direction to tunneling operations. Intuitively, the entire process is not only harmless to minority shareholders
but may even promote their well-being.
Tunneling and propping are the two major behavioral patterns exhibited by controlling shareholders in
conducting related-party transactions. The two opposing patterns may be found in the same company at dif-1 The majority shareholders of listed ﬁrms tend to support these ﬁrms in the face of ﬁnancial distress. A case in point is China Eastern
Airlines, which suﬀered tremendous losses in 2008 because of the failure of its aviation fuel hedging. The company’s losses were so huge
that its total debt exceeded its total assets. On April 17, 2009, the ﬁrm was tagged for special treatment (ST). Its controlling shareholder,
the SASAC, injected 3 billion RMB and 4 billion RMB in capital in November 2008 and December 2009, respectively, thus saving the
company from a severe crisis. The cases of China Southern Airlines and Air China are similar.
2 The capping-uncapping-capping phenomenon is not uncommon among Chinese listed ﬁrms. ST Zhujiang was saved from being
delisted three times and was at risk of delisting in 2001, earning it the nickname “the ﬁrm best at fooling.”
3 Friedman et al. (2003) ﬁnd that in 1997 when the Asian ﬁnancial crisis hit, controlling shareholders of listed ﬁrms in many emerging
Asian markets provided funding, loan guarantees, capital injections and other forms of support to the ﬁrms they controlled if those ﬁrms
were faced with ﬁnancial distress.
Q. Ying, L. Wang /China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 133–147 135ferent times. The question is when and to what extent shareholders choose to tunnel or prop. Friedman et al.
(2003) develops a model suggesting that when a ﬁrm is facing a medium-level adverse impact, the optimal deci-
sion for its controlling shareholders is to prop up the ﬁrm. In cases with little or no adverse impact, in contrast,
the optimal policy is to tunnel. In extreme cases, the optimal choice is complete tunneling. The model pro-
posed by Friedman et al. (2003) helps us to better understand the essence of tunneling operations and the
transfer of proﬁts. However, as they themselves point out, there is insuﬃcient evidence to support the theory
of the transfer of proﬁts. Friedman et al. (2003) also fail to provide evidence of tunneling. The stock market
and its regulation in China provide us with an excellent opportunity to classify the extent and timing of tun-
neling and propping. Firms listed in China face two special risks: the risk of being delisted and the risk of los-
ing their ability to issue new stocks. According to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
regulations, if a ﬁrm has a negative return on equity (ROE) for two consecutive years, it will be tagged for
special treatment (ST) and face multiple transaction restrictions. If it continues to lose money in the third year,
it will be delisted. Firms also face the risk of being deprived of the ability to issue new stocks because a ﬁrm
that issues new stocks must have an average ROE no lower than 6% to be in compliance with existing
regulations.
There is a very strict threshold for ﬁrms to gain listing status or issue new stocks in China. When ﬁrms are
delisted or deprived of the right to issue new stocks, their controlling shareholders suﬀer. Accordingly, when a
ﬁrm is at risk of either, its controlling shareholders have strong incentives to prop it up. Once they have suc-
ceeded in doing so, these shareholders may then engage in tunneling through related-party transactions. In this
study, we examine the transaction data of listed ﬁrms from 2002 to 2008 to investigate the propping and tun-
neling operations of their controlling shareholders. Propping includes the sale of goods, provision of credit
guarantees and capital injections. We discover that institutional factors, the maintenance of “shells” and
the attainment of reﬁnancing qualiﬁcations to be the most common reasons for controlling shareholders to
prop up their ﬁrms. After successfully doing so, these listed ﬁrms are found to suﬀer from tunneling. Wealth
transfers from controlling shareholders can signiﬁcantly improve ﬁrm performance. However, when ﬁrms are
supported for shell maintenance and reﬁnancing reasons, a signiﬁcant decline in performance is seen in the
following year owing to tunneling.
A number of studies are closely related to our discussion in this paper. Jiang and Wang (2008), for example,
ﬁnd that controlling shareholders prop up earnings by using abnormal related sales when the listed ﬁrms they
control are at risk of being delisted or deprived of their ability to reﬁnance. Once such risks have been
removed, however, signiﬁcant cash transfers take place through related lending from the listed ﬁrms back
to their controlling shareholders. The overall operation is in essence a way of manipulating earnings in reac-
tion to speciﬁc regulations in the Chinese context. Liu and Lu (2007) are also of the opinion that earnings
manipulation by Chinese listed ﬁrms is to a great extent caused by the need for tunneling on the part of their
controlling shareholders. Peng et al. (2011) ﬁnd that when listed ﬁrms are ﬁnancially healthy, the market reacts
unfavorably to the announcement of related-party transactions, thus indirectly suggesting that these transac-
tions take place to expropriate from minority shareholders. When ﬁrms are in ﬁnancial distress, in contrast,
the market reacts favorably to such transactions, thus indicating that in this case they are taken as evidence of
controlling shareholders propping up earnings.
The work presented in this paper diﬀers from the aforementioned studies in several respects. First, we pro-
vide evidence to support the model developed by Friedman et al. (2003). We also provide evidence on the tim-
ing and consequences of propping and tunneling operations. The diﬀerence between our study and that of
Peng et al. (2011) is that rather than adopt direct measures as we do, they attempt to indirectly determine
whether controlling shareholders had conducted propping or tunneling operations using the market’s reaction
to related-party transactions disclosed at diﬀerent times, whereas we identify the nature of these operations by
observing the direction of related-party transactions.4 In this paper, we also conﬁrm that shell maintenance
and the attainment of a reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation are the two vital motivations for propping and tunneling4 As Peng et al. (2011) point out, there are shortcomings to identifying the nature of related-party transactions, i.e., whether they
constitute propping or tunneling, by their direction because the nature of such transactions is also related to detailed prices. However, with
a few exceptions, the cash recipient is the beneﬁciary of a related-party transaction. In this paper, we at least provide additional evidence of
the propping and tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders and the connection between them.
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ﬁrms after propping them up. Previous studies, such as that of Jian and Wong (2010), test this relation, but
they only take into account two speciﬁc forms of related-party transactions, that is, related-party sales and
inter-corporate loans. However, as Peng et al. (2011) point out, propping and tunneling can be implemented
through any type of related-party transaction. Therefore, in this paper, we deﬁne related-party transactions as
the sale of goods, provision of guarantees, inter-corporate loans, equity transfers and asset transactions. We
conﬁrm that controlling shareholders with the motivation to maintain shell resources and/or obtain a reﬁ-
nancing qualiﬁcation can carry out earnings manipulation using any form of related transaction to prop up
and then tunnel from their ﬁrms. Third, this paper compares controlling shareholder behavior in three cases:
the motivation for shell maintenance, the motivation to obtain a reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation and other motiva-
tions. The results show that subsequent wealth transfers (tunneling) after propping are signiﬁcant only in the
ﬁrst two cases. Jian and Wong (2010) make no such distinction or comparison. Furthermore, they fail to con-
sider the behavioral diﬀerences among the controlling shareholders of ﬁrms with diﬀerent types of ownership.
In this paper, in contrast, we compare the behavior of the controlling shareholders of state-owned and pri-
vately owned enterprises. We ﬁnd that when the motivation is to obtain a reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation, controlling
shareholders’ tunneling subsequent to propping is more prominent in state-owned enterprises than in their pri-
vately owned counterparts. Finally, our investigation of the inﬂuence of related-party transactions on ﬁrm per-
formance further corroborates our rationale for using the direction of these transactions to measure propping
and tunneling operations.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides the background to our research and
presents our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and sample. Section 4 presents anal-
ysis of our empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Research background and hypotheses
2.1. Analysis of the intention to prop up operations
In the Friedman et al. (2003) model, the optimal policy for a ﬁrm facing a medium-level adverse impact is to
prop up operations. In circumstances with little or no adverse impact, the optimal choice is to tunnel. In
extreme cases, the optimal policy is to tunnel extensively. As previously noted, the CSRC regulations stipu-
lating delisting and termination of the right to reﬁnance in the face of poor ﬁrm performance aﬀect the timing
of controlling shareholders’ tunneling and propping operations.
The Chinese stock issuance system is bureaucratic, with government approval needed for almost every step.
The government controls the minimum requirements for and the scale and even pace of stock issuance, which
results in diﬃculties in going public and, consequently, current listed ﬁrms become important shell resources.
These shell resources are important because they are both scarce and provide a valuable platform for stock-
holders to obtain extremely high beneﬁts, such as the qualiﬁcation to reﬁnance, ﬁrm popularity and fame, and
the enjoyment of preferential policies. However, their value is ﬁnite. The risks of being delisted or having reﬁ-
nancing restrictions imposed constitute direct threats to ﬁrms’ ability to proﬁt from the capital market on an
ongoing basis.
According to a CSRC provision that came into force in 1998, a ﬁrm that loses money for two consecutive
years is tagged as a ST company. In 1999, the CSRC introduced the particular transfer (PT) rule, according to
which a ST company was tagged as a PT company if it suﬀered a third consecutive ﬁnancial loss. ST ﬁrms face
multiple restrictions. For example, their pricing limit is 5%, they have to provide audited interim reports and
they are prohibited from raising new funds in the stock market. PT stocks can only be traded on Fridays, with
an upper limit of 5%. If a PT ﬁrm gains no proﬁts in the subsequent year, it is delisted. In 2002, the CSRC
repealed the PT rule, but retained the provisions for ST ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm suﬀers a ﬁnancial deﬁcit in three con-
secutive years, it is delisted directly without being tagged for PT. The CSRC’s aim in enforcing these regula-
tions is investor protection. However, as Jian and Wong (2010) point out, the ST provision has had many
unexpected and serious consequences. For example, numerous healthy ﬁrms risk being delisted because of
a temporary loss and the controlling shareholders of unhealthy ﬁrms are able to engage in earnings manipu-
lation. Bai et al. (2004) ﬁnd that it is not uncommon for controlling shareholders to prop up ST ﬁrms for the
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Peng et al. (2011) point out that if a ﬁrm listed in China is faced with a delisting crisis, the market reacts favor-
ably to its related-party transactions, possibly in anticipation of the ﬁrm’s shareholders providing it with sup-
port through these transactions.
In addition to the ST provision, the CSRC also places rigorous restrictions on reﬁnancing activities through
the allotment of shares. A provision that came into force in 1996 requires that a ﬁrm looking to qualify for
reﬁnancing must have net asset yields of 10% for three consecutive years. In 1999, the criterion was amended
to average ROE over 10% and in each year no lower than 6%. There is empirical evidence to indicate that
many ﬁrms carry out wealth transfers and earnings manipulation to meet this requirement (Chen and Yuan,
2004; Haw et al., 2005). In 2001, the CSRC amended the restriction again, now requiring that the average net
asset yield should reach 6% in the past 3 years. Following this amendment, controlling shareholders began to
display greater concern over how to obtain an average ROE of more than 6%.
As it is diﬃcult to gain listing status and issue new stocks in China, when a ﬁrm is delisted and deprived of
stock issuance rights, its controlling shareholders suﬀer tremendous losses. In the face of such threats, these
shareholders thus have particularly strong incentives to prop up their ﬁrms, which in essence is a form of earn-
ings management. Earnings management activities undertaken to maintain shell resources and reﬁnancing
qualiﬁcations circumvent government regulation and can thus be seen as institution-driven. Until the CSRC
changes its policies, the motivation to maintain shell resources and reﬁnancing rights will continue to drive
propping-up activities. Hence, the controlling shareholders of both state- and privately owned ﬁrms will con-
tinue to have strong incentives to temporarily prop up their ﬁrms. We thus posit the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Maintaining shell resources and reﬁnancing qualiﬁcations are important motivators for
controlling shareholders to provide their ﬁrms with support.2.2. Controlling shareholders’ post-propping behavior
Controlling shareholders may engage in diﬀerent types of propping operations for a variety of reasons. In
addition to maintaining shell resources and reﬁnancing rights, some controlling shareholders may support
their ﬁrms to improve long-term proﬁtability. The actions that take place after propping are also likely to dif-
fer depending on the purpose of the propping operations. Claessens and Fan (2002) report that shareholders’
ownership proportion and share structure directly determine the extent of the separation between the right to
receive cash payments and control rights. The extent of this separation further inﬂuences the behavior of con-
trolling shareholders. Reducing the degree of separation helps to reduce controlling shareholders’ expropria-
tion and strengthening the right to receive cash payments increases the number of propping operations they
carry out. Denis and McConnell (2003) ﬁnd that when the largest shareholder holds a very large or very small
proportion of shares, we see the alignment eﬀect and entrenchment eﬀect, respectively. The alignment eﬀect
occurs when the largest shareholder holds a very high proportion of shares and it thus takes stronger action
to support the ﬁrm. In most cases, such supportive operations have the purpose of improving the long-term
performance of the ﬁrm.
By the same logic, when the controlling shareholder’s holding ratio and the ﬁrm’s ownership structure meet
certain requirements, or when the ﬁrm has a good governance structure, the controlling and minority share-
holders may have consistent interests. In such cases, the former’s propping operations are beneﬁcial to the
long-term development of the ﬁrm. Their timing is determined by the ﬁrm’s long-term development plan
and they are carried out with the purpose of increasing the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm. Accordingly, they do
not necessarily have a connection with maintaining shell resources or reﬁnancing qualiﬁcations. However,
if the controlling shareholders instead provide support for these institution-driven purposes, the propping
tends to be temporary. It is possible that these shareholders are merely making preparations to tunnel from
minority shareholders in the future, which may not be good news for the long-term development of the ﬁrm.
Zhang and Zeng (2006) use TopSoft to illustrate the drivers of controlling shareholders’ propping and tunnel-
ing operations. They point out that the propping up of listed ﬁrms is generally an intermediate rather than
ultimate goal. The ultimate goals of these ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders are to qualify for ﬁnancing in the
stock market and to better prepare themselves for future tunneling activities. Jian and Wong (2010) also note
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propping. It is clear that the controlling shareholders of listed ﬁrms in China rarely prop up their ﬁrms out of
concern over their long-term proﬁtability. Instead, they do so to improve ﬁrm performance temporarily, thus
allowing them to keep the shell resources in hand and qualify for reﬁnancing. On achieving this goal, they
often carry out tunneling operations. Minority shareholders are the victims of this process. At the same time,
the weaknesses in China’s legal system make it diﬃcult to distinguish the legality of related-party transactions
between controlling shareholders and listed ﬁrms. Without internal or external supervision, it is relatively easy
for controlling shareholders to manipulate earnings by means of connected transactions to maintain shell
resources and reﬁnancing rights.
Furthermore, under the CSRC’s current approval system, state-owned ﬁrms can generally obtain reﬁnanc-
ing approval more easily than non-state-owned ﬁrms even when both meet the basic requirements to qualify
for reﬁnancing. Therefore, once a reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation has been obtained, state-owned ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier
to realize that reﬁnancing. Thus, the controlling shareholders of these ﬁrms are more likely to request a higher
return and engage in tunneling in the year after their propping activities. Accordingly, we posit the following
two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A. There is a signiﬁcant transfer of wealth in listed ﬁrms that have been propped up for shell
maintenance and reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation purposes, whereas no such transfer takes place in ﬁrms that have
been supported for other purposes.
Hypothesis 2B. When motivated by the desire to qualify for reﬁnancing, the controlling shareholders of state-
owned ﬁrms are more likely to transfer wealth from the listed ﬁrms that they propped up the previous year
compared to their non-state-owned counterparts.2.3. Propping, wealth transfers and ﬁrm performance
The propping operations of controlling shareholders inﬂuence the performance of listed ﬁrms. In compli-
ance with the CRSC’s regulations, ﬁrms try to improve current-period earnings to qualify for reﬁnancing and
maintain shell resources. To achieve this objective, their controlling shareholders conduct wealth transfers by
means of related-party transactions, capital injections and M&As because such operations can improve ﬁrm
performance in the current period. Bai et al. (2004) discover a special phenomenon in the Chinese capital mar-
ket: ST ﬁrms have a rate of return that is 31.8% higher than that of the market in the 2 years after being so
tagged. The reason, they note, is that the controlling shareholders of these ﬁrms shift resources to them to
maintain control and reﬁnancing qualiﬁcations, thereby temporarily improving ﬁrm performance. Li et al.
(2005) illustrate that M&As carried out when a ﬁrm is facing allotment or is trying to avoid a deﬁcit are usu-
ally carried out for propping purposes. These M&As can improve ﬁrm performance in the accounting sense,
whereas those carried out for other purposes have a less signiﬁcant inﬂuence on performance. As previously
noted, controlling shareholders sometimes prop up ﬁrms for reasons other than improving long-term proﬁt-
ability. If their rationale is to maintain shell resources or qualify for reﬁnancing, they tend to subsequently
engage in tunneling or even require payback, thereby expropriating from minority shareholders. Peng et al.
(2011) ﬁnd that when a listed ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress, the market reacts positively to information disclosed
about its related-party transactions, which suggests that the propping operations of controlling shareholders
can improve ﬁrm performance. However, when a ﬁrm is performing well ﬁnancially, the market displays an
unfavorable reaction to related-party transaction disclosures because it anticipates that such tunneling activ-
ities will have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. Therefore, if controlling shareholders support a listed ﬁrm
merely for the temporary purpose of shell maintenance and reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation, the ﬁrm will experience a
temporary improvement in performance, but that performance will soon deteriorate because of the subsequent
tunneling operations. This discussion brings us to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Propping operations can signiﬁcantly improve a listed ﬁrm’s performance in the current year,
but subsequent tunneling operations will result in a signiﬁcant performance decline.
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3.1. Sample and data sources
Our data comprises all related-party transactions undertaken from 2002 to 2008 by companies listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The data was carefully screened for transactions between listed
companies and related parties. We manually remove projects unrelated to propping and wealth transfers, such
as joint investments and labor/management agreements, to isolate the related-party transactions of interest.
We then reﬁne the original sample by excluding listed ﬁnancial institutions and companies with incomplete
data. Finally, to avoid the eﬀect of outliers, we winsorize the sample. Our ﬁnal sample thus contains 9348
related-party transaction observations, including 2913 observations of propping operations by controlling
shareholders. Our related-party transaction data is from the RESSET ﬁnancial research database and other
ﬁnancial data is from the CCER ﬁnancial research database.3.2. Variable measurements
3.2.1. Measure of the propping behavior of controlling shareholders
Propping can be represented by speciﬁc types of related-party transactions, albeit in the opposite direction
to tunneling (Jian and Wong, 2010). Peng et al. (2011) point out that related-party transactions constitute the
major means of both propping and tunneling among the large shareholders of listed companies in China.
Large shareholders not only transfer wealth through a variety of related-party transactions, such as the pur-
chase of goods, loan guarantees and asset injections, they also exploit listed companies through the sale of
goods, a reverse form of guarantees and the illegal use of funds.
In the absence of eﬀective legal and regulatory systems, the motivations for related-party transactions are
diﬃcult for regulators and minority shareholders to detect and thus these transactions are frequently used as
earnings manipulation tools by controlling shareholders. As a result, they constitute the best proxy variable
for measuring controlling shareholder behavior. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) point out that related-party trans-
actions, particularly the sale of goods to related parties, can act as a proxy variable for such measurement. Jian
and Wong (2010) deduct normal related-party transactions from total related-party transactions using an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and use the residuals as abnormal related-party transactions to mea-
sure excess propping or tunneling behavior on the part of controlling shareholders. In this paper, we employ
the same approach to test whether controlling shareholders prop up their companies. Our empirical model isProp ratei;t ¼ r0 þ r1  Sizei;t þ r2  Levi;t þ r3  Tobinqi;t þ
X
rj  Industryi;t þ ei;t: ð1ÞIn this model, Prop_ratei,t represents possible propping transactions as a proportion of total assets. We ﬁrst
classify funding, guarantees, mortgages and other related-party transactions by controlling shareholders that
generate income for the company as possible propping transactions. We then use the residuals of Model (1) to
represent excess propping operations. Related-party transactions may constitute normal business and thus to
calculate the number of actual propping operations, we must remove those transactions that are a normal part
of business. A company’s size, debt ratio, business development opportunities and industry are the most
important variables aﬀecting normal related-party transactions, and we thus use them as control variables.
We set Sizei,t as the logarithm of asset size, Levi,t as the debt ratio and Tobinqi,t as Tobin’s Q to measure busi-
ness development opportunities. We also control for industry dummies in Model (1). If the residual term in the
model is greater than 0, then the dummy variable Prop takes the value of 1, thus indicating that there is excess
propping. Otherwise, it takes the value of 0. Prop thus serves as an indicator to show whether there is excess
propping. In robustness tests, Prop_rate, the ratio of possible propping activities to total assets, is used as an
alternative proxy variable for controlling shareholders’ propping behavior.3.2.2. Measurement of tunneling after propping
Subsequent tunneling is measured similarly to propping, although in the opposite direction of related-party
transactions. For listed companies, the possible sources of tunneling are the purchase of goods or assets, guar-
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party transactions that confer cash upon the related parties of the listed ﬁrm, the residual amount of
related-party transactions then indicates controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior. If the residual amount
is greater than 0, then the dummy variable Tunnel takes the value of 1, indicating the presence of excess tun-
neling, and otherwise is 0. Thus, the dummy variable Tunnel serves as an indicator to show whether there is
excess tunneling. In robustness tests, Tunnel_rate, the ratio of the possible tunneling amount (measured as the
amount of related-party transactions with the related parties of listed ﬁrms as the cash recipients) to total
assets is used as an alternative proxy variable for controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior.3.2.3. Measurement of controlling shareholders’ incentives to engage in propping
According to a special provision published by the CSRC in 2001, Chinese listed companies that operate at a
loss for three consecutive years face delisting. This provision has prompted the controlling shareholders of
many listed companies to prop up and support these companies after two consecutive annual losses. There-
fore, to measure propping activities that are driven by the motivation to maintain shell resources, we use
the dummy variable Baoqiao, which takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s ROE in the two previous consecutive
years has been less than 0, and the value of 0 otherwise.
Pursuant to the 2001 CSRC regulations concerning reﬁnancing ability, listed companies must have an aver-
age ROE of at least 6% in the past 3 years to qualify for new stock issuance. The controlling shareholders of
companies whose average return on assets (ROA) in the past 2 years was in the vicinity of 6% have strong
motivation to prop up these companies in the third year to ensure that they meet the conditions for reﬁnanc-
ing. For companies with a 2-year average ROE far less than 6%, propping alone will not help them to satisfy
the threshold conditions. For those with a 2-year average ROE far more than 6%, these conditions can be sat-
isﬁed without propping. Thus, in neither circumstance do controlling shareholders have an incentive to prop
up their ﬁrms. To measure propping behavior motivated by the desire to meet the threshold for reﬁnancing, we
use the dummy variable Peigu. If a ﬁrm’s average ROE in the past 2 years is between 4% and 8%, the value of
this dummy variable is 1, and otherwise is 0. In addition to the incentives to maintain shell resources and qual-
ify for reﬁnancing, we also consider propping driven by other motivations, for example, propping undertaken
to protect the long-term interests of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, taking into account that the propping and wealth-
transfer behavior of controlling shareholders is likely to be aﬀected by independent directors, external regu-
lation, ownership structure and property rights, we include them as control variables. All of the variables used
in this paper and their deﬁnitions are provided in Table 1.3.3. Empirical models
In Hypothesis 1, we propose the attainment of reﬁnancing rights and maintenance of shell resources as
important controlling shareholder motivations. To test this hypothesis, we design the following econometric
models.ProbitðPropi;tÞ ¼ a0 þ a1  Peigui;t þ a2  Baoqiaoi;t þ a3  Controli;t þ e ð2Þ
Prop ratei;t ¼ a0 þ a1  Peigui;t þ a2  Baoqiaoi;t þ a3  Controli;t þ e ð3ÞPeigu and Baoqiao measure controlling shareholders’ motivation to qualify for reﬁnancing and maintain shell
resources, respectively. The proportion of independent directors on the board, external auditor type and ﬁrm
ownership structure are included as control variables, as they are expected to inﬂuence shareholder behavior.
To increase the robustness of the results, we also used the ratio of shareholders’ supporting funds to total as-
sets, Prop_rate, as an alternative proxy variable for propping in empirical testing.
In Hypothesis 2, we propose that propping by controlling shareholders can be classiﬁed according to its
underlying motivation. Driven by the motivation to qualify for reﬁnancing and maintain shell resources, con-
trolling shareholders of listed companies are posited to display signiﬁcant tunneling behavior. However, prop-
ping without a regulatory arbitrage purpose may imply careful consideration of the long-term interests of the
company. In this case, the listed ﬁrm would exhibit no signiﬁcant tunneling behavior. To test this hypothesis,
we design the following econometric model.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Abbreviation Deﬁnition
Excess propping measure
(dummy variable)
Prop Dummy variable: if excess propping exists, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Propping measure (continuous
variable)
Prop_rate Amount of propping funds/total assets
Excess tunneling measure
(dummy variable)
Tunnel Dummy variable: if tunneling occurs next year, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Tunneling measure (continuous
variable)
Tunnel_rate Next year’s tunneling amount/total assets
Return on equity ROE Current year’s return/net assets
Return on assets ROA Current year’s return/total assets
Motivation to obtain reﬁnancing
qualiﬁcation
Peigu Dummy variable: if past 2 years’ average ROE is 4–8%, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Motivation to maintain shell
resources
Baoqiao Dummy variable: if past 2 years’ average ROE is negative, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Propping carried out to qualify
for reﬁnancing
Propping1 Dummy variable: if propping behavior matches the obtaining–reﬁnancing–
qualiﬁcation motivation, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Propping carried out to maintain
shell resources
Propping2 Dummy variable: if propping behavior matches the maintaining-shell-resources
motivation, denoted as 1; otherwise 0
Propping carried out for other
purposes
Propping3 Dummy variable: if propping behavior matches no speciﬁc purpose, denoted as 1;
otherwise 0
Proportion of independent
directors
Indep Number of independent directors/board size
Big-4 CPA ﬁrm Top4 Dummy variable: if ﬁrm is audited by a Big-4 CPA ﬁrm, takes a value of 1;
otherwise 0
Concentration of three largest
shareholders
Share3 Stake of the top-three shareholders/stake of the top-10 shareholders
Ownership State Dummy variable: takes the value of 1 for state-owned enterprises; otherwise 0
Asset size Size Logarithm of total assets
Debt ratio Lev Total debt/total assets
Tobin’s Q Tobinq Total market capitalization/total assets
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the next year, and Propi,t indicates whether they prop up the company in the current year. We include inde-
pendent directors, external regulation and ownership structure as control variables. On the basis of this model,
we classify propping behavior according to its underlying motivation and perform the same empirical tests.
Considering the endogeneity of the Prop variable because of the “generated regressor” problem (Pagan,
1984), we apply the classical two-step treatment eﬀects model (Maddala, 1983) to control for this endogeneity
problem. To further test and verify the inﬂuence of propping and tunneling on ﬁrm performance, we further
add the following diﬀerence models to our tests.DPerfi;t ¼ a0 þ a1  DProp ratei;t þ a2  DLevi;t þ a3  DTobinqi;t þ a4  DSalesi;t þ a5  DAssetsi;t
þ a6 
X
Indþ a7 
X
Yearþ e ð5Þ
DPerfi;t ¼ a0 þ a1  DTunnel ratei;t þ a2  DLevi;t þ a3  DTobinqi;t þ a4  DSalesi;t þ a5  DAssetsi;t
þ a6 
X
Indþ a7 
X
Yearþ e ð6ÞIn these models, DPerfi,t is the change in ﬁrm performance from the previous year to the current year. We use
ROE and ROA as proxy variables for change in ﬁrm performance. DProp_ratei,t is the diﬀerence in the
amount of propping demonstrated by controlling shareholders between the current and previous years, and
DTunnel_ratei,t is the diﬀerence in their amount of tunneling between these 2 years. The other control variables
we include are the asset-liability ratio, Tobin’s Q, operating income and asset size, all of them in diﬀerence
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diﬀerence in each variable to remove unobservable individual ﬁrm eﬀects that do not change over time. These
individual eﬀects may be simultaneously related to shareholders’ propping or tunneling operations and to ﬁrm
performance. Removing individual eﬀects by diﬀerences controls for the endogeneity problem to a certain
extent.
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics of controlling shareholders’ propping and tunneling behavior
The descriptive statistics of the relevant variables of controlling shareholders’ propping and tunneling
behavior are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange-listed companies with related-party
transactions, those whose controlling shareholders engaged in excessive propping account for 35.14% on aver-
age. The amount of propping-oriented related-party transactions is RMB12.19 billion on average, accounting
for 41.77% of total assets. The companies whose controlling shareholders engage in tunneling immediately
after propping account for 78.37% of all propped-up companies, with the amount of tunneling accounting
for 20.71% of total assets. We can conclude that controlling shareholders do transfer wealth after propping.
Table 2 also shows that the proportion of companies displaying excess propping and the ratio of the propping
amount to total assets are both signiﬁcantly higher in 2007 and 2008 than in the other years. The most likely
explanation is that the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 created business diﬃculties for the listed com-
panies in the sample, which thus experienced poorer ﬁnancial performance. In these circumstances, the ﬁrms’
controlling shareholders signiﬁcantly increased their propping activities to stabilize ﬁnancial performance.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the suspected motivations for controlling shareholders’ propping
behavior. Overall, maintaining shell resources and qualifying for reﬁnancing are the most important propping
motivations, accounting for 14.82% and 11.78%, respectively, of all propping observations on average and for
a considerable proportion in every year. Table 4 further describes shareholders’ propping and subsequentTable 2
Sample distribution of controlling shareholders’ propping and tunneling behavior.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Number of listed companies involved in related-party transactions 1029 1133 1260 1220 1367 1372 904 1184
Number of listed companies displaying excess propping behavior 287 373 354 394 457 675 373 416
Proportion of listed companies displaying excess propping behavior (%) 27.89 32.92 28.10 32.30 33.43 49.20 41.26 35.14
Number of listed companies exhibiting excess tunneling behavior after
propping
243 322 297 363 397 389 268 326
Proportion of listed companies exhibiting excess tunneling behavior
after propping (%)
84.67 86.33 83.90 92.13 86.87 57.63 71.85 78.37
Amount of suspected propping transactions (in RMB billion) 7.90 9.40 11.00 12.00 12.00 19.00 14.00 12.19
Ratio of propping amount to total assets (%) 34.90 36.00 37.70 37.30 40.50 63.00 43.00 41.77
Amount of post-propping tunneling (in RMB billion) 6.20 5.70 6.30 7.80 12.00 8.00 8.40 7.77
Ratio of post-propping tunneling amount to total assets (%) 19.70 18.10 16.00 19.20 33.50 19.10 19.40 20.71
Table 3
Distribution of suspected motivations for controlling shareholders’ propping behavior.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Number of excessively propped companies 287 373 354 394 457 675 373 416
Number of observations with suspected reﬁnancing motivation 49 58 52 60 59 100 55 62
Proportion of observations with suspected reﬁnancing motivation (%) 17.19 15.46 14.60 15.23 12.98 14.77 14.75 14.82
Number of observations with suspected shell resource motivation 22 43 43 41 46 104 44 49
Proportion of observations with suspected shell resource motivation (%) 7.67 11.53 12.15 10.41 10.07 15.41 11.80 11.78
Number of observations with other motivations 216 272 259 293 352 471 274 305
Proportion of observations with other motivations (%) 75.14 73.01 73.25 74.36 76.95 69.82 73.45 73.40
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for propping behavior of controlling shareholders under diﬀerent motivations.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Suspected reﬁnancing
motivation
Amount of propping to total assets (%) 50.20 51.90 55.70 44.30 60.50 75.80 51.00 55.63
Amount of next year’s post-propping
tunneling to total assets (%)
22.40 20.70 23.60 24.60 46.30 13.50 15.80 23.84
Suspected shell
maintenance
motivation
Amount of propping to total assets (%) 60.30 39.90 71.90 51.20 64.80 90.00 78.20 65.19
Amount of next year’s post-propping
tunneling to total assets (%)
21.30 33.40 23.70 16.50 25.40 16.90 28.10 23.61
Other motivations Amount of propping to total assets (%) 33.10 39.30 47.60 43.40 45.80 69.90 48.30 46.77
Amount of next year’s post-propping
tunneling to total assets (%)
15.60 13.20 12.50 16.50 26.70 11.00 13.20 15.53
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assets” suggests that observations whose suspected motivations were the maintenance of shell resources and
attainment of a reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation exhibited more prominent propping activities than those with other
motivations in any given year. These results reﬂect institutional factors’ strengthening of controlling share-
holders’ willingness to prop up their companies when they reach the critical values for these two institu-
tion-driven motivations. The comparison of the “ratio of post-propping tunneling amount to total assets”
suggests that observations driven by these motivations experience more intense subsequent tunneling than
those driven by other motivations.
4.2. Empirical results and discussion
In this section, we report the results of further tests of the hypotheses using regression models. These results
give us a more reasonable and convincing explanation of the motivations for and consequences of controlling
shareholders’ propping behavior and its relationship with tunneling behavior and ﬁrm performance.
4.3. Propping motivations of controlling shareholders
We ﬁrst need to verify whether controlling shareholders with suspected shell resource and reﬁnancing qual-
iﬁcation motivations have a greater propensity to prop up listed companies and whether that propping is more
intense than when other motivations are in play. The empirical results presented in Table 5 show that both
Peigu and Baoqiao have a signiﬁcant positive relationship with the propping variables (both the propping
dummy variable and propping continuous variable), which suggests that when driven by these two institu-
tion-oriented motivations, controlling shareholders tend to prop up their listed companies. We further ﬁnd
them to be important motivations for the controlling shareholders of both state- and non-state-owned enter-
prises, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported by the empirical
evidence.
The results for the other control variables show that the ratio of independent directors on the board does
not aﬀect the behavior of controlling shareholders. Listed companies audited by Big-4 accounting ﬁrms are
less likely to be propped up, possibly because a high-quality audit reduces earnings manipulation. A higher
ownership concentration implies that the controlling shareholder has a greater stake in the listed company,
which leads to a greater probability and amount of propping. In addition, asset size and the asset-liability ratio
also aﬀect the propping behavior of controlling shareholders.
To further test whether there is signiﬁcant post-propping tunneling among listed companies whose control-
ling shareholders are driven by the motivation to maintain shell resources or qualify for reﬁnancing, we run
regressions using empirical Model (4). In addition, we use the two-step treatment eﬀects model (Maddala,
1983) to control for the endogenous selection bias of the propping variable. More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst step,
Table 5
Empirical results of motivation analysis of controlling shareholders’ propping behavior.
Prop (dummy variable) Prop_rate (continuous variable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Peigu 0.207*** 0.187*** 0.207*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.043***
(6.64) (3.59) (6.62) (7.29) (3.17) (7.27)
Baoqiao 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.172*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.033**
(4.82) (4.78) (2.65) (4.67) (4.58) (2.45)
Peigu  State 0.030 0.018
(0.49) (1.54)
Baoqiao  State 0.042 0.013
(0.53) (0.75)
Indep 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Top4 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(4.66) (4.66) (4.65) (4.33) (4.35) (4.31)
Share3 1.970*** 1.965*** 1.971*** 0.335*** 0.332*** 0.336***
(12.41) (12.35) (12.41) (13.25) (13.07) (13.27)
State 0.006 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.007
(0.18) (0.45) (0.39) (1.52) (0.26) (1.09)
Size 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(4.90) (4.82) (4.90)
Lev 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071***
(6.20) (6.14) (6.29)
Tobinq 0.012* 0.012* 0.011*
(1.85) (1.91) (1.82)
Constant 2.688*** 2.671*** 2.686*** 0.402*** 0.386*** 0.402***
(9.55) (9.42) (9.55) (5.46) (5.20) (5.46)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 9348 9348 9348 9348 9348 9348
Pseudo R2/R2 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.102 0.101 0.101
Notes: The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-values. We also set the critical values of the two previous years’ average ROE for the Peigu variable
to 5–7% and 4.5–7.5%, and our conclusions remain unchanged.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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regression yields the endogenous selection bias correction term Hazard, which is then included in the sec-
ond-step regression using Model (4). The detailed regression results are presented in Table 6.5
The regression results indicate that controlling shareholders’ subsequent tunneling behavior is signiﬁcantly
related to their motivation for propping. Those motivated by the desire to maintain shell resources or obtain a
reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation are signiﬁcantly more likely to engage in tunneling in the year after propping relative
to those whose propping have some other motivation. The implication is that controlling shareholders with
another motivation may be providing real support that is in the long-term interests of the listed companies
they control. Hence, no signiﬁcant tunneling behavior is observed in the year after propping in these ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 2A is thus veriﬁed. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between the ultimate con-
troller of the listed company and the propping variable shows that in the shareholder sample whose propping
was motivated by the desire to qualify for reﬁnancing, state-owned enterprises display signiﬁcantly more post-
propping tunneling behavior than their non-state-owned counterparts. This result supports Hypothesis 2B.
However, tunneling does not necessarily occur in the year immediately following the propping activity, but5 In this paper, the propping variable is lagged to the tunneling variable by one period. Thus, the endogeneity problem should not aﬀect
the regression results to a great extent. We also run the regression using Model (4) directly without controlling for the selection bias term,
and the main results remain the same. The detailed regression results are omitted here, but they are available from the authors upon
request.
Table 6
Empirical analysis of whether tunneling takes place after propping by controlling shareholders.
Sample of propping with the
reﬁnancing motivation
Sample of propping with the shell
resources motivation
Sample of propping for other
motivations
1 2 3 4 5 6
Propping1 0.263*** 0.087
(5.48) (1.14)
Propping1  State 0.257***
(3.01)
Propping2 0.142** 0.170*
(2.24) (1.68)
Propping2  State 0.043
(0.35)
Propping3 0.034 0.012
(0.77) (0.15)
Propping3  State 0.030
(0.32)
Indep 0.015 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Top4 0.056 0.055 0.060 0.060 0.042 0.041
(1.05) (1.03) (1.12) (1.12) (0.78) (0.77)
Share3 0.926*** 0.920*** 0.939*** 0.939*** 1.089*** 1.087***
(6.05) (6.01) (6.15) (6.15) (7.06) (7.05)
State 0.163*** 0.126*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.169***
(5.16) (3.75) (5.08) (5.01) (5.22) (5.05)
Hazard 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.253*** 0.253***
(4.27) (4.29) (7.75) (7.74) (11.52) (11.52)
Constant 1.970*** 1.896*** 1.279*** 1.282*** 1.342*** 1.343***
(7.12) (6.78) (6.28) (6.29) (6.60) (6.61)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 9348 9348 9348 9348 9348 9348
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.036 0.040
Notes: The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-values. We also set the critical values of the two previous years’ average ROE for the Peigu variable
at 5–7% and 4.5–7.5%, and our conclusions remain unchanged.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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tunneling behavior within 2 years of propping, and the main results remain unchanged.6
4.4. Behavior of controlling shareholders and performance of listed ﬁrms
To further determine what inﬂuence controlling shareholders’ propping and wealth-transfer behavior has
on ﬁrm performance, we apply the empirical models in Eqs. (5) and (6) and run further regressions. The results
are presented in Table 7. It can be seen that a change in the amount of propping by controlling shareholders
has a signiﬁcant and positive relationship with a change in company ROE (DROE) and that a change in the
amount of tunneling in the following year has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on company ROE in the next year.
These results suggest that the propping behavior of controlling shareholders does aﬀect ﬁrm performance,
which is in line with Hypothesis 3. These results also further conﬁrm the validity of using the direction of
related-party transactions to identify propping and tunneling.
In addition, the regression results in Table 7 also show that the relationship between changes in ROA and
controlling shareholders’ propping and tunneling behavior is not signiﬁcant. The most likely explanation is6 To save space, we omit the detailed regression results from this paper, but they are available from the authors upon request.
Table 7
Empirical analysis of whether propping and tunneling in the next year result in a change in ﬁrm performance.
Current year DROE Current year DROA Next year DROE Next year DROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Current year DProp_rate 0.050** 0.001
(2.47) (0.39)
Next year DTunnel_rate 0.044** 0.003
(2.37) (0.81)
Current year DLev 0.120 0.294***
(0.90) (16.10)
Current year DTobinq 0.068*** 0.005
(3.26) (1.40)
Current year DSales 0.053*** 0.023***
(2.79) (7.67)
Current year DAssets 0.038** 0.000
(2.54) (0.14)
Next year DLev 0.234* 0.297***
(1.80) (17.42)
Next year DTobinq 0.044*** 0.001
(2.77) (0.21)
Next year DSales 0.052*** 0.027***
(3.05) (9.51)
Next year DAssets 0.017 0.001
(1.28) (0.32)
Constant 0.002 0.022* 0.239*** 0.047***
(0.02) (1.72) (5.22) (4.08)
Year Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 7501 7501 9348 9348
R2 0.014 0.227 0.012 0.17
Notes: The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-values. The critical values of the two previous years’ average ROE for the Peigu variable were also
set at 5–7% and 4.5–7.5%, and the conclusions remain unchanged.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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but do change asset size and proﬁts. As a result, related-party transactions may have a greater eﬀect on ROE
than ROA. To a certain extent, this result also suggests that it is easier for controlling shareholders to manip-
ulate the ROE of their companies than the ROA. However, current CSRC regulations impose restrictions pri-
marily on ROE rather than ROA, which provides room for controlling shareholders to manipulate ﬁrm
earnings to get around these regulations.
5. Conclusion
Propping is one of the most important types of behavior displayed by controlling shareholders. In this
paper, we examine related-party transaction data for listed ﬁrms in China during the 2002–2008 period and
investigate the intentions, consequences and mechanisms of controlling shareholders’ propping operations
and their connections with tunneling behavior. We ﬁnd the institution-driven intentions of shell resource
maintenance and reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation to be the two most important reasons for the controlling sharehold-
ers of listed ﬁrms to prop up their ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms propped up for these reasons suﬀer tunneling
in the following year. Supportive activities motivated by other goals are more likely to be long-lasting and are
found not to be accompanied by signiﬁcant wealth-transfer activities in the following year. Controlling share-
holder propping can signiﬁcantly improve ﬁrm performance in the current year, but when its motivation is
shell maintenance or reﬁnancing qualiﬁcation, that performance will experience a signiﬁcant decline in the fol-
lowing year because of controlling shareholders’ subsequent tunneling activities.
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on their motivation for it. Propping activities motivated by the two aforementioned institution-driven goals
are usually transitory, whereas those that occur for other purposes are more sustainable. Therefore, the Chi-
nese regulatory authorities should look more closely at the related-party transactions of listed ﬁrms, particu-
larly those driven by the desire to maintain shell resources and qualify for reﬁnancing, to better regulate the
short-term activities of these ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders.
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